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This	was	not	due	to	a	surge	 in	 low-carbon	nuclear	or	renewable	sources;	 instead	 it	was	the	much-7	
overlooked	impact	of	fuel	switching	from	coal	to	natural	gas	generation.		This	Perspective	considers	8	
the	 enabling	 conditions	 in	 Britain	 and	 the	 potential	 for	 rapid	 fuel	 switching	 in	 other	 coal-reliant	9	
countries.	 	Spare	generation	and	fuel	supply-chain	capacity	must	already	exist	for	fuel	switching	to	10	
deliver	 rapid	 carbon	 savings,	 and	 to	 avoid	 further	 high-carbon	 infrastructure	 lock-in.	 	 More	11	
important	 is	 the	 political	 will	 to	 alter	 the	 marketplace	 and	 incentivise	 this	 switch,	 for	 example	12	














cost	 decarbonisation6,7;	 however,	 it	 may	 take	 another	 three	 decades	 to	 achieve	 a	 10%	 share	 of	27	
electricity	 generation8,	 and	 “expectations	 for	 CCS	 are	 very	 low	 in	 the	 current	 environment”9	 after	28	
continued	delays	and	cancellations10.	With	cumulative	carbon	emissions	being	a	major	determinant	29	
of	climate	change11,	any	early	opportunities	to	reduce	emissions	within	months	rather	than	decades	30	







in	 the	 absence	 of	 any	major	 accident	 or	 disaster.	 Figure	 1	 puts	 these	 changes	 in	 context;	 against	37	
market-led	fuel	switching	in	China	and	the	US,	renewables	deployment	in	Germany,	and	incremental	38	
efficiency	 improvements	 in	 Poland.	 The	 unprecedented	 deployment	 of	 nuclear	 power	 lowered	39	




Figure	1:	The	 carbon	 intensity	of	electricity	generation	 in	 six	 countries	over	 the	 last	half-century.	 	 Carbon	 intensity	 for	44	
gross	 electricity	 output	 (not	 accounting	 for	 losses	 in	 transmission	and	distribution).	 	 The	 legend	 indicates	 the	 depth	and	45	
duration	of	sustained	reductions	in	emissions	intensity	within	each	country.		Data	from	refs.	14,15.	46	
This	 Perspective	 argues	 that	with	 the	 right	 conditions,	 both	 in	 terms	of	pre-existing	 infrastructure	47	
and	 political	 will,	 switching	 away	 from	 coal	 has	 an	 important	 role	 to	 play	 in	 the	 rapid	 early	48	
decarbonisation	 of	 power	 systems.	 This	 provides	 immediate	 benefits	 to	 other	 sectors,	 which	 will	49	
decarbonise	faster	through	electrification	due	to	lower	associated	emissions.	50	
Britain’s	power	generation	51	
Coal	was	 the	 largest	 source	of	electricity	generation	 for	 the	 first	hundred	years	of	Britain’s	power	52	
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This	 ‘dash-for-gas’	 in	Britain	was	not	 replicated	 in	Germany	or	elsewhere	 in	Europe,	and	although	58	
termed	a	‘dash’	it	took	eight	years	(1991–99)	for	new	gas	capacity	to	be	built	and	halve	coal’s	share	59	
of	generation	from	66%	to	34%.	Over	the	last	decade,	the	US	has	shifted	away	from	coal	and	lignite	60	








renewables	 changed	 by	 less	 than	 1	 TWh	 due	 to	 underlying	 weather	 conditions22.	 	 For	 context,	69	
Britain’s	switch	from	coal	to	gas	in	2016	was	greater	than	all	other	European	countries	combined23.	70	
If	sustained,	this	rapid	reduction	arguably	puts	Britain	well	ahead	of	its	near-term	carbon	reduction	71	
trajectory,	 as	 it	 could	 now	beat	 its	 carbon	 targets	 for	 2018-22	within	 the	 timeframe	of	 the	2013-72	
2017	 carbon	 budget24.	 However,	 as	 power	 sector	 emissions	 are	 part	 of	 the	 EU	 Emissions	 Trading	73	
Scheme	 (referred	 to	 as	 the	 traded	 sector),	 the	 net	 UK	 carbon	 accounting25	 means	 that	 these	74	
reductions	can	be	‘exported’	from	the	power	sector	as	a	surplus	to	other	parts	of	the	traded	sector	75	
(e.g.	heavy	industry)	potentially	in	other	countries	in	Europe.	Under	agreed	carbon	accounting	rules,	76	
they	 cannot	 be	 allocated	 to,	 or	 purchased	 by	 the	 non-traded	 sectors	 in	 Britain	 (e.g.	 domestic	77	
transport	or	heat)	to	provide	additional	carbon	headroom26.	Nevertheless,	the	significant	reduction	78	



















































































unabated	 coal	 by	 202527,28,	 marking	 the	 world’s	 first	 commitment	 to	 abandoning	 coal	 power29.	83	
Although	 this	 deadline	 helps	 frame	 the	 Government’s	 commitment	 to	 decarbonisation,	 there	 is	84	










centuries	of	production	and	 consumption	 (Figure	3).	 	 The	 latter	 fell	 to	12	Mt	 in	201633,	 levels	not	95	
seen	since	193534.		The	rate	of	this	change	is	unprecedented;	it	took	14	years	for	power	sector	coal	96	
demand	to	increase	from	12	to	28	million	tonnes	per	annum	(1936	to	1950),	but	only	1	year	to	make	97	
the	 reverse	 transition	 (2015	 to	2016).	 	 Britain	 could	be	 the	 first	 country	 to	 leave	 its	 coal	 reserves	98	






































• The	political	will	was	available	to	 intervene	 in	markets	to	 incentivise	the	switch,	penalising	110	
coal	vs.	gas	generation	via	an	effective	carbon	price.	111	
• Coal	and	gas	prices	were	sufficiently	close	so	that	switching	did	not	inflict	large	price	rises	on	112	






policy	 and	 the	 enabling	 conditions	 and	 the	 investment	 in	 generation	 and	 infrastructure	 for	 the	119	
switch	to	take	place	were	decades	in	the	making.		The	EU	Large	Combustion	Plant	Directive	(2001)37	120	
and	 Industrial	Emissions	Directive	 (2010)31	aided	 in	closing	half	of	Britain’s	coal	capacity;	while	the	121	





carbon	 emissions.	 	 Since	 2005	 British	 power	 stations	 were	 subject	 to	 the	 EU	 Emissions	 Trading	127	
Scheme	 (ETS)	 but	 it	 delivered	 carbon	 prices	 that	 were	 too	weak	 to	 drive	 sustained	 lower-carbon	128	
investment40–43.	 To	 address	 this,	 Britain	 introduced	 the	 Carbon	 Price	 Support	 (CPS)	 policy	 in	 2013	129	





2017	 level	of	£18/tCO2	at	 least	until	2021.	 	While	 this	 suggests	diminished	ambition	 in	 the	 face	of	135	
6	
cost	 sensitivities,	 it	 should	 be	 compared	 to	 an	 EU-ETS	 price	 of	 approximately	 €5/tCO2	 throughout	136	
2016.	137	
Debate	 continues	 about	 the	 floor	 price45–47.	 	Whilst	 it	 has	 been	 effective	 in	 promoting	 the	 switch	138	
from	 coal	 to	 existing	 natural	 gas	 generation,	 it	 has	 failed	 to	 incentivise	 construction	 of	 new	 low-139	
carbon	 generation,	 which	 continue	 to	 require	 other	 forms	 of	 financial	 support.	 	 The	 cost	 to	140	










Electricity	prices	are	 from	the	day-ahead	spot	market.	Generation	cost	consists	of	 fuel	combusted	 (divided	by	conversion	150	
efficiency)	 and	 carbon	 emitted	 (multiplied	 by	 carbon	 price),	 neglecting	 other	 aspects	 such	 as	maintenance	 and	 network	151	




ETS	 carbon	 price,	 despite	 the	 sharp	 rise	 in	 international	 coal	 prices	 through	 2016	 (due	 to	 China	156	
cutting	 production	 by	 10%)52.	 	 Instead,	 the	 CPF	 allowed	 gas	 generation	 to	 become	 equivalent	 or	157	
cheaper	 since	 the	 beginning	 2016	 and	 displace	 coal’s	 share	 of	 generation.	 In	 terms	 of	 historical	158	
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Fuel	 switching	 is	 not	 unidirectional,	 and	 could	 equally	 be	 reversed	while	 coal	 generation	 capacity	161	
remains	available	over	the	coming	years,	helped	by	capacity	market	payments.		All	this	would	take	is	162	
another	 shift	 in	 relative	 fuel	 prices	 or	 a	 weakening	 of	 the	 carbon	 price	 to	 increase	 coal’s	 annual	163	
market	share.	164	
Leaving	the	markets	to	it	165	
Britain’s	 experience	 shows	 that	 liberal	markets	 can	 rapidly	 adjust	 to	well-timed	well-aimed	 policy	166	
signals.		Policy	is	not	an	essential	ingredient	though,	as	America	demonstrates	that	a	confluence	of	167	
market	 factors	 can	drive	 fuel	 switching	alone,	 albeit	 at	 a	 slower	pace.53–55	 	 Since	2005	natural	 gas	168	
prices	have	 fallen	70%	compared	 to	25%	 for	 coal	due	 to	 increased	production	and	 the	 inability	 to	169	





focus	 on	 decarbonisation.	 Carbon	 pricing	 at	 a	 federal	 level	which	would	 accelerate	 fuel	 switching	175	
from	 coal	 to	 natural	 gas	 is	 therefore	 improbable	 under	 the	 Trump	 administration.	 The	 US	 has	 a	176	
complex	 range	 of	 political	 drivers	 from	 federal	 environmental	 regulations	 impacted	 by	 sector	177	
lobbying,	 layered	with	 further	 political	 drivers	 at	 state	 level.	Within	 this	melange	 of	 political	 and	178	
market	 forces,	 it	 is	difficult	 to	 suggest	 future	 levels	of	 fuel	 switching	with	any	degree	of	 certainty.	179	
Federal	 regulations	have	 switched	back	and	 forth	 to	 favour	different	 technologies,	which	 suggests	180	
the	benefit	of	having	legal	multi-decadal	targets	to	aim	for.	Britain	is	not	immune	from	lobbying	and	181	
switching	regulations	back	and	forth	to	suit	different	technologies,	but	 it	has	pioneered	the	use	of	182	
long-term	 legal	 targets	 in	 the	2008	Climate	Change	Act38.	This	has	kept	 the	 long-term	ambition	on	183	
track	 regardless	 of	 the	 change	 of	 policy	makers	 and	 the	 political	 pressure	 to	 rescind	 policies	 that	184	
become	unpopular	with	core	voters.	185	
Potential	for	fuel	switching	in	Germany	186	










Germany	 is	 self-sufficient	 for	 lignite	but	 imports	 89%	of	 its	 hard	 coal57,	 as	 its	 geology	makes	 local	195	
production	 internationally	 uncompetitive.	 	 Import	 dependency	 for	 natural	 gas	 is	 similarly	 90%,	196	
although	only	one-sixth	of	demand	 is	 from	the	power	sector	as	gas	 is	primarily	used	for	heating18.		197	
Around	 15bcm/year	 (~150	 TWh/year)	 of	 spare	 capacity	 exists	 in	 the	 Nordstream	 pipeline	 for	198	
increased	 gas	 supplies58,	 with	 an	 additional	 55bcm/year	 (540	 TWh/year)	 if	 Nordstream	 2	 is	199	
constructed.	 At	 a	 national	 level,	 it	 seems	 the	 fuel	 supply	 infrastructure	 has	 the	 potential	 to	200	
accommodate	significant	levels	of	fuel	switching.	201	
However,	 several	 reasons	 temper	 Germany’s	 desire	 to	 take	 this	 route,	 not	 least	 the	 security	202	
implications	of	swapping	indigenous	lignite	to	imported	natural	gas.		Germany’s	decision	to	remove	203	
nuclear	generation	provides	an	additional	challenge:	installing	60	GW	of	wind	and	solar	power	in	the	204	
last	 decade	 has	 done	 little	 more	 than	 offset	 the	 lost	 output	 from	 the	 10	 GW	 of	 retired	 nuclear	205	
power32.	 	 Both	 considerations	 were	 not	 applicable	 to	 Britain,	 which	 has	 no	 lignite	 mines,	 and	 in	206	
contrast	 to	 Germany,	 is	 embracing	 new	 nuclear	 build.	 Germany	 is	 a	 fascinating	 interaction	 of	207	
political	 economy	 interests,	 with	 a	 lignite	 lobby	 that	 capitalises	 on	 security	 of	 supply	 and	 cost	208	
arguments	for	Germany’s	energy	transition.	However,	without	the	development	of	Carbon	Capture	209	
and	Storage	in	Germany	(which	currently	seems	highly	challenging)	at	some	point	lignite	generation	210	







































Biomass Carbon Price (£/T)









































Germany	has	24	GW	of	 gas-fired	power	 stations,	 compared	 to	28	GW	of	hard	 coal	 and	21	GW	of	213	










Quantifying	 an	 accurate	 global	 potential	 for	 fuel	 switching	 requires	 a	 detailed	 country-by-country	224	
analysis	 of	 infrastructure,	 generation	 and	 demand,	 prices	 and	 policies.	 	 Nonetheless,	 the	 broad	225	
order-of-magnitude	can	be	estimated	using	statistics	for	annual	generation	and	installed	generating	226	
capacity.	 	 We	 estimate	 the	 potential	 for	 fuel	 switching	 in	 the	 30	 largest	 coal	 consuming	 nations	227	
(covering	 97%	 of	 global	 coal	 capacity)	 by	 compiling	 the	 amount	 of	 coal	 and	 lignite	 generation	 in	228	
2015,	 and	 comparing	 this	 to	 the	additional	 generation	 that	 could	 come	 from	gas	 in	 each	 country.		229	





due	 to	 their	 lower	 efficiency	 and	 thus	 higher	 carbon	 intensity.	 	We	 assume	CO2	 emissions	 of	 405	235	
g/kWh	 for	CCGTs	and	710	g/kWh	 for	OCGTs,	 relative	 to	1025±55	g/kWh	 for	national	 coal	 fleets14.		236	
Sources,	details	and	justification	are	given	as	supplementary	information.	237	
Figure	 6a	 shows	 the	 potential	 for	 fuel	 switching	 across	 the	 OECD	 and	 coal-reliant	 developing	238	
countries.	 	 Many	 European	 countries	 (including	 Britain)	 have	 over-built	 power	 systems	 with	239	






















While	 this	analysis	 is	only	a	 first-order	approximation,	 it	 suggests	 that	 fuel	 switching	 in	 the	power	260	
sector	 could	 provide	 a	 significant	 boost	 to	 global	 decarbonisation.	 	 However,	 fuel	 switching	 is	 no	261	
silver	bullet,	and	many	barriers	can	explain	why	only	a	small	percentage	of	the	estimated	potential	262	
has	been	realised	thus	far.	263	
Fuel	 switching	 will	 change	 supply-chain	 and	 energy	 security	 risks,	 and	 in	 many	 countries	 would	264	
create	 political	 tensions	 by	 increasing	 import	 dependency	 for	 primary	 energy.	 	 Although	265	
employment	in	the	coal	sector	has	fallen	dramatically	in	many	western	countries,	policies	which	are	266	
seen	to	further	decimate	domestic	mining	industries	will	 face	opposition,	as	seen	in	America.	Over	267	
the	 longer	 term,	 politicians	must	 grapple	with	 the	 consequences	 of	 transitioning	 away	 from	 solid	268	

























































Annual generation from coal (TWh)




























Maximum utilisation of single-cycle gas 









There	are	also	risks	with	carbon	 leakage	 in	highly	 interconnected	markets	such	as	Germany61,62.	 	A	271	
strong	 carbon	price	 to	 promote	 fuel	 switching	 can	 reduce	within-country	 emissions,	 but	may	 also	272	
shift	 electricity	 production	 (and	 thus	 carbon	 emissions)	 to	 areas	 subject	 to	 a	 lower	 carbon	 price.	273	
Britain	now	imports	high-carbon	electricity	from	the	Netherlands,	where	coal	usage	increased	40%	274	
and	 generators	 pay	 one-fifth	 the	 carbon	 price.	 	 Supranational	 harmonisation	 of	 carbon	 pricing	 is	275	
needed	to	avoid	the	'offshoring'	of	power	sector	emissions.		Other	considerations,	such	as	the	level	276	
of	methane	leakage	in	the	natural	gas	supply	chain	must	also	be	carefully	assessed63,64.	277	
Carbon	pricing	however	 is	not	a	blanket	policy	that	will	work	everywhere.	 	 In	countries	which	 lack	278	
the	gas	infrastructure	such	as	Poland	or	Japan,	raising	a	carbon	price	would	in	the	short	term	be	no	279	
less	 blunt	 than	 a	 blanket	 tax	 on	 electricity.	 	 In	 the	 longer	 term,	 a	 careful	 balance	 is	 needed	 to	280	
redirect	how	existing	infrastructure	could	be	used	without	going	so	far	as	to	incentivise	building	new	281	
gas	 infrastructure	and	avoidable	 carbon	 lock-in.	 	 If	no	more	carbon	emitting	electricity	generation	282	




by	 the	 scale	 of	 existing	 coal	 and	 gas	 infrastructure,	 and	 natural	 gas	 is	 incompatible	 with	 deep	287	
decarbonisation68,69	unless	carbon	capture	and	storage	emerges	from	its	‘valley	of	death’10.		If	spare	288	
capacity	 already	 exists,	 then	 fuel	 switching	 does	 not	 require	 several	 years	 to	wind	 up	 to	material	289	





MtCO2.	 Fuel	 switching	 can	 demonstrably	 achieve	 very	 rapid	 carbon	 reductions.	 In	 comparison	295	
renewables	 took	six	years	 to	grow	from	4%	to	19%	of	Britain’s	generation	 (a	45	TWh/yr	 increase),	296	





can	have	minimal	 impact	on	consumers,	as	seen	 in	Britain.	 	Natural	gas	 retains	 the	energy	system	302	















out	 of	 the	 atmosphere74.	 	 However,	 it	 is	 vital	 to	 cumulative	 emissions	 that	 the	 gains	 of	 early	317	
decarbonisation	from	fuel	switching	are	not	squandered	by	the	extended	use	of	gas	generation	as	a	318	
substitute	for	the	necessary	increase	in	low-carbon	technologies.	319	
The	 potential	 for	 rapid	 and	material	 global	 emissions	 reductions	 appears	 to	 have	 gone	 unnoticed	320	
thus	far;	it	is	about	time	that	the	benefits	of	fuel	switching	deserved	greater	attention.	321	
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